In an article published by the American magazine Foreign Policy, it’s reported that military history suggests that Ukraine’s current counteroffensive against the Russian military is far more challenging than widely perceived.
For the Ukrainian armed forces to achieve their goals as outlined in Kyiv’s stated policy, which aims to reclaim all territories seized by Russia since 2014 – including the Crimean Peninsula – they face one of the toughest military tasks: breaking through well-fortified and well-equipped Russian positions, as the article suggests.
Following such a breakthrough, Ukrainians would then need to find maneuvering space, either by rapidly advancing towards strategic areas like the Sea of Azov, hoping to expose remnants of the Russian army along the way, or attempting to encircle significant Russian forces with the aim of “annihilation,” according to Barry Bosn, a professor of political science in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as cited in the article.
The author warns that failure in such a military campaign would likely lead Ukraine into a “ominous” and long war of attrition, pitting it against a state with a larger population.
Naturally, Ukraine aims to avoid such a scenario by achieving a successful breakthrough in its ongoing military campaign, as noted by Bosn. He further adds that military history confirms that challenges like those presented in such campaigns are more arduous than commonly understood, at least among the general public in the West.
The issue of military breakthroughs became evident during World War I when European nations were densely populated enough to defend frontlines spanning their entire borders in some cases. Vast improvements in firepower range, accuracy, and lethality greatly assisted their wartime efforts.
In the early days of World War II, precise tank performance, fighter aircraft, and wireless devices allowed adept attackers to overcome enemy defenses. However, defenders eventually discovered ways to exploit the same available tools.
Bosn believes that lessons from both world wars indicate that combat swiftly transforms into brutal, bloody battles of attrition.
Within the scope of what fighters are allowed to do, notes the American academic in his article, Ukraine’s attempts to address certain military issues – particularly the challenge of penetrating enemy defenses for the first time, a matter now known to all – are hindered by what the Russians are doing. They have created an intense and high-specification defense system, with minefields, deep anti-tank trenches, and concrete obstacles that slow down the attackers.
When a Ukrainian unit becomes stuck in an obstacle or minefield, Russian helicopters launch missiles to reinforce their defenses. Given that Russian pilots employ low-altitude flight tactics and the range of their anti-tank weapons, these helicopters pose a challenge to Ukrainian ground-based air defenses.
As Bosn puts it, these obstacles and fires work to slow down the Ukrainian attackers and ultimately lead to their destruction.
The author of the article suggests that Ukraine’s artillery arsenal, missile launchers, and drones are not inherently capable of destroying Russian defenses. However, the ongoing campaign alone might address this question.
In an initial assessment, it appears that the small number of Russian forces on the ground has raised hopes of successful attacks against them. According to Bosn’s calculations in his article, the war began with perhaps around 40 military brigades, some of which were targeted, while most suffered significant attrition. But the summoning of Russian reserves in the fall of 2022 allowed them to amass their fighting strength.
The Russians may have added combat units to their forces in Ukraine, according to the author, who cites a statement from U.S. General Christopher Cavoli, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in April, saying that Russian forces in Ukraine have grown stronger than they were at the start of the war.
Bosn says that Cavoli didn’t provide figures but he heard that their numbers have increased to 300,000 soldiers compared to 200,000 at the beginning of the conflict.
The summer offensive of the Ukrainian forces in Bukyri is still ongoing, and according to the author, even as he writes this article, it appears that Ukrainians are making progress in what seems to be a major attack aimed at the Sea of Azov. There is also another supporting attack around the city of Bahmut.
Even if this operation gains momentum, there are still two significant problems that Ukrainians must confront, according to the Foreign Policy article. These are the Russian tactical reserves scattered in their way and the Russian operational reserves that may gather to launch counterattacks along Ukrainian frontlines.
In conclusion, the author emphasizes that history suggests these operations require significant equipment, planning, and military skills, but observers shouldn’t be surprised if this Ukrainian attack results in partial success at best.
